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INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this paper is to examine the effects of the new law
of the sea on the Antarctic legal regime. Its classification of those
effects as legal and political is arbitrary to some extent. ' Such a classi-
fication nevertheless highlights important distinctions in the emer-
gence of a new law of the sea. Among these are the conceptual
distinction between the traditional processes of customary interna-
tional law and the development of law through global multilateral
negotiation; the procedural distinction between regulation by ad hoc
functional arrangements among states directly concerned and regula-
tion by a global organization; and the substantive distinction between
a body of rules devoted largely to the traditional task of defining the
respective rights and duties of states inter se and a body of rules
designed to create and give effect to collective legal rights of humanity
as a whole.
I. THE ANTARCTIC REGIME
The physical characteristics of Antarctica and its legal regime are
amply described by other papers in this series and elsewhere. 2 Certain
aspects of that regime will be highlighted for purposes of this paper.
A. THE ANTARCTIC TREATY
Twelve states3 originally concluded the Antarctic Treaty of
1959.4 All members of the United Nations may accede to the Treaty.5
1. Professor Francioni, for example, might disagree with this classification in some
respects, particularly because it treats the principle of the common heritage of mankind
exclusively in terms of political effects. See Francioni, Legal Aspects of Mineral Exploita-
tion in Antarctica, 19 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 163 (1986). In response, the Author would
argue that even if the common heritage principle has legal content and is applicable to the
deep seabeds or cultural artifacts as a matter of customary international law, the question
of whether it should be applied to Antarctica and, if so, in what form, is at present primar-
ily a political rather than a legal question. No evidence exists of anything approaching a
consensus on that matter. On a broader front, the Author has no desire to engage those
who regard law as a branch of political science.
2. See Joyner, Protection of the Antarctic Environment: Rethinking the Problems and
Prospects, 19 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 259 (1986); Simma, The Antarctic Treaty as a Treaty
Providing for an "Objective Regime'" id. at 189; Conforti, Territorial Claims in Antarctica:
A Modern Way to Deal With an Old Problem, id. at -; Antarctic Resources: A New Inter-
national Challenge, 33 U. MIAMI L. REV. 285 passim (Symposium 1978); Bernhardt, Sover-
eignty in Antarctica, 5 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 297 (1975); Burton, New Stresses on the Antarctic
Treaty: Toward International Legal Institutions Governing Antarctica Resources, 65 VA. L.
REv. 421 (1979); Guyer, The Antarctic System, 139 RECUEIL DES COORS 150 (Vol. II
1973).
3. Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Chile, France, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, South
Africa, the U.S.S.R., the United Kingdom, and the United States.
4. Antarctic Treaty, Dec. 1, 1959, 12 U.S.T. 794, T.I.A.S. No. 4780, 402 U.N.T.S. 71.
The complete text of the Treaty is reprinted in the Appendix, infra.
5. Antarctic Treaty, Appendix, infra, art. XIII, para. 1. Other states may also be
invited to accede. Id. The following states have acceded to the Treaty: Brazil, Bulgaria,
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It provides that "each of the Contracting Parties undertakes to exert
appropriate efforts, consistent with the Charter of the United Nations,
to the end that no one engages in any activity in Antarctica contrary
to the principles or purposes of the present Treaty."'6
The "Consultative Parties" to the Antarctic Treaty are the twelve
original parties, and any other party during such time as it demon-
strates its interest in Antarctica by conducting substantial scientific
research activity there, such as the establishment of a scientific station
or the dispatch of a scientific expedition.7 "[M]easures in furtherance
of principles and objectives of the Treaty" are adopted at meetings of
the Consultative Parties8 and become effective when approved by all
the Consultative Parties entitled to attend the meeting at which the
measures were considered. 9
The Treaty permits a Consultative Party to designate observers to
inspect all areas of Antarctica. 10 In addition, a Consultative Party
may carry out aerial observation "at any time over any or all areas of
Antarctica." 1
The Antarctic Treaty applies to the area south of 60* South lati-
tude, including all ice shelves. 12 However, the Treaty does not "preju-
dice or in any way affect the rights, or the exercise of the rights, of any
State under international law with regard to the high seas within that
area."'13
Certain states have territorial claims over part of the Antarctic
continent.1 4 Some of these claims overlap. 15 Part of the continent is
unclaimed. '
A significant number of non-claimant states do not recognize the
validity of any of the territorial claims in Antarctica. Some of these
states may believe they themselves have a basis for a claim to all or
part of the continent.16
China, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Finland, the
German Democratic Republic, Hungary, India, Italy, the Netherlands, Papua New
Guinea, Peru, Poland, Romania, Spain, Sweden, and Uruguay.
6. Id., art. X.
7. Id., art. IX, paras. 1-2. In addition to the original parties, supra note 3, the Con-
sultative Parties now include Brazil, China, the Federal Republic of Germany, India,
Poland, and Uruguay. Italy may become a Consultative Party in the near future.
8. Id., art. IX, para. 1.
9. Id., art. IX, para. 4.
10. Id., art. VII, para. 3.
11. Id., art. VII, para. 4.
12. Id., art. VI.
13. Id. (emphasis added).
14. The claimant states are Argentina, Australia, Chile, France, New Zealand, Nor-
way, and the United Kingdom. See Map, Appendix, infra.
15. The claims of Argentina, Chile, and the United Kingdom overlap. See Map,
Appendix, infra.
16. This group may include the U.S.S.R. and the United States.
1986]
214 CORNELL INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 19:211
Article IV of the Antarctic Treaty "freezes" the status of territo-
rial claims as of June 23, 1961, the date the Treaty entered into force.
The first paragraph protects the position of the claimants, the position
of parties that may have a basis of claim, and the position of parties
that do not recognize any other state's claim or basis of claim. 17 The
second paragraph provides that, after the Treaty's entry in force:
No acts or activities taking place while the present Treaty is in force shall
constitute a basis for asserting, supporting or denying a claim to territorial
sovereignty in Antarctica or create any rights of sovereignty in Antarctica. No
new claim, or enlargement of an existing claim, to territorial sovereignty in
Antarctica shall be asserted while the present Treaty is in force.'
8
The following are among the substantive rules of the Antarctic
Treaty relevant to the analysis in this paper:
[1] Antarctica shall be used for peaceful purposes only. There shall be pro-
hibited, inter alia, any measures of a military nature, such as the establishment
of military bases and fortifications, the carrying out of military maneuvers, as
well as the testing of any type of weapons.
19
[2] Freedom of scientific investigation in Antarctica and cooperation toward
that end, as applied during the International Geophysical Year, shall continue,
subject to the provisions of the present Treaty.20
[3] Any nuclear explosions in Antarctica and the disposal there of radioactive
waste material shall be prohibited. 2
B. OTHER AGREEMENTS PROTECTING ANTARCTIC
LIVING RESOURCES
In addition to the Agreed Measures for the Conservation of
Antarctic Flora and Fauna adopted under the Antarctic Treaty,22
three treaties are directly relevant to the conservation of living
resources in the waters surrounding Antarctica: (1) the 1946 Interna-
tional Convention for the Regulation of Whaling, which established a
system for the global regulation of whaling, including waters of the
Southern Ocean; 23 (2) the 1972 Convention for the Conservation of
Antarctic Seals (Seal Convention);24 and (3) the Convention for the
Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (Marine Living
17. Antarctic Treaty, Appendix, infra, art. IV, para. 1.
18. Id., art. IV, para. 2.
19. Id., art. I, para. 1.
20. Id., art. II.
21. Id., art. V, para. 1.
22. Agreed Measures for the Conservation of Antarctic Flora and Fauna, June 2-13,
1964, 17 U.S.T. 996, T.I.A.S. No. 6058, modified in 24 U.S.T. 1802, T.I.A.S. No. 7692
(1973).
23. International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling, Dec. 2, 1946, T.I.A.S.
No. 1849, 161 U.N.T.S. 72; Protocol, Nov. 19, 1956, 10 U.S.T. 952, T.I.A.S. No. 4228, 338
U.N.T.S. 366.
24. Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic Seals, June 1, 1972, 27 U.S.T. 441,
T.I.A.S. No. 8826 (entered into force Mar. 11, 1978) [hereinafter cited as Seal Convention].
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Resources Convention).25
The latter two treaties deal specifically with the waters surround-
ing Antarctica and are closely tied to the Antarctic Treaty. Their
negotiation as separate treaties, rather than as agreed measures under
the Antarctic Treaty, facilitates the participation of concerned states
that do not qualify as Consultative Parties under the Antarctic Treaty.
In addition, the fact that these are separate treaties permits them to
deal with living resources in areas outside the scope of the Antarctic
Treaty, such as the high seas and areas north of 60* South latitude.26
The 1972 Seal Convention establishes a regulatory system for
conserving seals south of 60* South latitude.2 7 The Convention was
negotiated by a limited number of interested parties and is open to
accession by others only "with the consent of the Contracting Par-
ties."28 With respect to territorial claims, the Seal Convention
expressly affirms article IV of the Antarctic Treaty.2 9
The 1980 Marine Living Resources Convention establishes a reg-
ulatory system for conserving all Antarctic marine living resources,
including birds, south of 60* South latitude; the Convention's regula-
tory system also extends to "the area between that latitude and the
Antarctic Convergence which form part of the Antarctic marine
ecosystem." '30
The Marine Living Resources Convention was negotiated by a
number of interested states who constitute the original parties.
Although the Convention is also "open for accession by any State
interested in research or harvesting activities in relation to the marine
living resources to which [the] Convention applies," 31 membership in
the regulatory Commission is limited to the original parties and an
acceding party "during such time as that acceding Party is engaged in
research or harvesting activities in relation to the marine living
resources to which [the] Convention applies."' 32 The latter determina-
tion is subject to a decision by the Commission which may require
consensus.
33
25. Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources, May 20,
1980, 80 Stat. 271, T.I.A.S. No. 10240 (entered into force Apr. 7, 1982) [hereinafter cited as
Marine Living Resources Convention].
26. Antarctic Treaty, Appendix, infra, art. VI.
27. Seal Convention, supra note 24, art. 1(I).
28. Id., art. 12.
29. Id., art. 1(1).
30. Marine Living Resources Convention, supra note 25, art. I, para. 1.
31. Marine Living Resources Convention, supra note 25, art. XXIX, para. 1. The
Antarctic Convergence is described in the Convention by various points, one of which
extends as far north as 45* South latitude. Id. See Map, Appendix, infra.
32. Id., art. VII, para. 2(a)-(b).
33. Id., art. VII, para. 2(d); art. XII, paras. 1-2.
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The Marine Living Resources Convention incorporates by refer-
ence numerous provisions of the Antarctic Treaty. Mirroring article
X of the Antarctic Treaty, the Convention provides that "[e]ach Con-
tracting Party undertakes to exert appropriate efforts, consistent with
the Charter of the United Nations, to the end that [none of the signa-
tories] engages in any activity contrary to the objective of this Conven-
tion. '' 34 With respect to claims, the Marine Living Resources
Convention not only expressly affirms article IV of the Antarctic
Treaty, but also protects the positions of states that "claim or have a
basis of claim to exercise coastal state jurisdiction under international
law" within the area, as well as the positions of states that do not
recognize any such claim or basis of claim. 35 Thus, in general, the
approach of the Antarctic Treaty to disputed claims of territorial sov-
ereignty is expressly applied to claims of coastal state jurisdiction in
the Marine Living Resources Convention.
II. THE LAW OF THE SEA
Law is always changing. The date one chooses to distinguish old
from new is always somewhat arbitrary, always a half-truth. The
focus of this inquiry is the impact on the Antarctic regime of changes
in the law of the sea since the conclusion of the Antarctic Treaty on
December 1, 1959. For purposes of this analysis, the "old" law of the
sea consists of the rules generally recognized as of that date, while the
"new" law of the sea consists of the rules generally recognized today.
Careful analysis of the various states' perceptions of the law of the
sea would reveal significant differences regarding the content of that
law both in 1959 and today: For the sake of simplicity, arbitrary
choices must be made regarding the content ofthe law at any given
time.
A. DESCRIPTION OF THE LAW OF THE SEA
L The "Old" Law of the Sea
The most convenient, and in many respects the most accurate,
evidence of the content of the law of the sea in 1959 can be found in
the texts of the four 1958 Conventions on the Law of the Sea. 36 These
34. Id., art. XXII, para. 1; see Antarctic Treaty, Appendix, infra, art. X.
35. Marine Living Resources Convention, supra note 25, art. IV.
36. Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, Apr. 29, 1958, 15
U.S.T. 1606, T.I.A.S. No. 5639, 516 U.N.T.S. 205 [hereinafter cited as Territorial Sea Con-
vention]; Convention on the High Seas, Apr. 29, 1958, 13 U.S.T. 2312, T.I.A.S. No. 5200,
450 U.N.T.S. 82; Convention on the Continental Shelf, Apr. 29, 1958, 15 U.S.T. 471,
T.I.A.S. No. 5578, 499 U.N.T.S. 311; Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Liv-
ing Resources of the High Seas, Apr. 29, 1958, 17 U.S.T. 138, T.I.A.S. No. 5969, 599
U.N.T.S. 285.
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Conventions were developed by the International Law Commission
after many years of work, relying in part on earlier codification efforts.
They were adopted in 1958 by the first United Nations Conference on
the Law of the Sea. To varying degrees, the four 1958 Conventions
were ultimately ratified by most of the major maritime states and
many others.
A majority of states, however, never ratified the 1958 Conven-
tions. At least two Consultative Parties to the Antarctic Treaty-
Argentina and Chile-asserted positions in 1958 regarding coastal
state rights to offshore resources that are more consistent with the law
as it exists today than with the law as described in the 1958
Conventions.
For the purposes of the present study, the most important charac-
teristics of the 1958 Conventions are the following:
(1) Coastal states are entitled to sovereignty over a territorial
sea adjacent to the coast, subject to a right of innocent passage for
ships of all states. 37 Agreement could not be reached on the maximum
permissible breadth of the territorial sea; the dispute centered on pro-
posals for a three-, six- or twelve-mile 38 maximum limit. The question
of coastal state jurisdiction over fisheries was an important part of that
dispute.
(2) All parts of the sea beyond the territorial sea are defined as
high seas, open to use by all nations under the principle of the freedom
of the high seas.39
(3) A significant qualification of the foregoing principle is that
the "coastal state exercises over the continental shelf [exclusive] sover-
eign rights for the purpose of exploring it and exploiting its natural
resources," and has a right to consent to "research concerning the
continental shelf and undertaken there."'40 The continental shelf is
defined in the 1958 Convention as
the seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas adjacent to the coast but outside
the area of the territorial sea, to a depth of 200 metres or, beyond that limit, to
where the depth of the superjacent waters admits of the exploitation of the
natural resources of the said areas.4 1
The question of the precise maximum extent of the seabed areas sea-
ward of 200-meters that could be regarded as part of the continental
shelf was, in effect, postponed.
37. Territorial Sea Convention, supra note 36, arts. 1-2, 14-23.
38. All references in this paper are to nautical miles.
39. Convention on the High Seas, supra note 36, arts. 1-2.
40. Convention on the Continental Shelf, supra note 36, arts. 2, 5(8).
41. Id., art. 1.
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2. The "New" Law of the Sea
The 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea pro-
vides the most convenient, and in many respects the most accurate,
evidence of the content of the law of the sea today. 42 This Convention
was the result of almost fifteen years of active work involving virtually
all independent states in existence today-a group twice as large as
that attending the 1958 Conference. The Third United Nations Con-
ference on the Law of the Sea functioned on the basis of consensus
until the closing moments of its substantive work. While too little
time has yet elapsed for the Convention to be widely ratified, almost
all states have signed it.43
It is important to bear in mind, however, that four parties to the
Antarctic Treaty-the Federal Republic of Germany, Peru, the
United Kingdom, and the United States-refused to sign the 1982
Convention. In Peru's case, the disagreement appears to relate to the
nature of the balance between coastal state and flag state rights in the
exclusive economic zone. In the case of the other three parties, the
disagreement appears to relate to the nature of the mining regime for
the seabed beyond the continental shelf. Their concerns regarding this
deep seabed mining regime are shared to some degree by other parties
to the Antarctic Treaty-including Belgium, France, Italy, Japan, and
the Netherlands-that have signed but not ratified the 1982 Conven-
tion. These states have negotiated an agreement that envisages the
possibility of deep seabed mining under high seas principles outside
the 1982 Convention system.44
Deep seabed mining apart, the United States has indicated that it
intends to act in a manner consistent with most if not all of the provi-
sions of the 1982 Convention. 45 This may be a generally accurate
42. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened for signature Dec. 10,
1982, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/122, reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 1261 (1982) [hereinafter cited as
Law of the Sea Convention].
43. On December 10, 1982, 119 states signed the Convention. Twenty-three countries,
including the United States, attended the signing ceremony in Jamaica but did not sign.
Twenty-four countries did not attend the ceremony. U.N. Dep't of Pub. Information, Press
Release SEA/514, at 2 (Dec. 10, 1982). As of the closing date of December, 1984, 159
countries had signed the Convention. To date, 26 countries have ratified the Convention.
Telephone interview with U.N. Law of the Sea Office (Apr. 14, 1986).
44. Interim Arrangements Relating to Polymetallic Nodules of the Deep Seabed, Sept.
2, 1982, T.I.A.S. No. 10562, reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 950 (1982); Provisional Understanding
Regarding Deep Seabed Matters, Aug. 3, 1984, T.I.A.S. No. -, reprinted in 23 I.L.M.
1354 (1984).
45. Three months after the Convention was opened for signature, the President of the
United States made the following statement:
Last July I announced that the United States will not sign the United Nations
Law of the Sea Convention .... We have taken this step because several major
problems in the Convention's deep seabed mining provisions are contrary to the
[Vol. 19:211
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description of the current attitudes of the Federal Republic of Ger-
many and the United Kingdom as well.
The 1982 Convention repeats many provisions of the 1958 Con-
ventions, elaborating on some and making significant changes in
others. For the purposes of this analysis, the most important elabora-
tions and changes contained in the 1982 Convention are the following:
(1) The 1982 Convention establishes a twelve-mile maximum
limit for the territorial sea.46
(2) The 1982 Convention defines the limit of the continental
shelf as the outer edge of the continental margin or 200 miles from the
coast,47 whichever is further seaward. 48 A coastal state is required to
make modest international payments for minerals (presumably hydro-
carbons) produced from the continental shelf in areas seaward of 200
miles from the coast, unless it is a developing country that is a net
interests and principles of industrialized nations and would not help attain the
aspirations of developing countries.
However, the Convention also contains provisions with respect to traditional
uses of the oceans which generally confirm existing maritime law and practice and
fairly balance the interests of all states.
Today I am announcing three decisions to promote and protect the oceans inter-
ests of the United States in a manner consistent with those fair and balanced results
in the Convention and international law.
First, the United States is prepared to accept and act in accordance with the
balance of interests relating to traditional uses of the oceans-such as navigation
and overflight. In this respect, the United States will recognize the rights of other
states in the waters off their coasts, as reflected in the Convention, so long as the
rights and freedoms of the United States and others under international law are
recognized by such states.
Second, the United States will exercise and assert its navigation and overflight
rights and freedoms on a worldwide basis in a manner that is consistent with the
balance of interests reflected in the Convention....
Third, I am proclaiming today an Exclusive Economic Zone in which the
United States will exercise sovereign rights in living and non-living resources
within 200 nautical miles of its coast.
Statement by the President, United States Oceans Policy, 19 WEEKLY COMP. PREs. Doc.
383 (Mar. 10, 1983), reprinted in 22 I.L.M. 464 (1983).
The President has also established clear guidelines for United States oceans policy
by stating that the United States is prepared to accept and act in accordance with
international law as reflected in the results of the Law of the Sea Convention that
relate to traditional uses of the oceans, such as navigation and overflight. The
United States is willing to respect the maritime claims of others, including eco-
nomic zones, that are consistent with international law as reflected in the Conven-
tion, if U.S. rights and freedoms in such areas under international law are
respected by the coastal state.
White House Press Secretary, Fact Sheet, United States Oceans Policy, Mar. 10, 1983,
reprinted in 22 I.L.M. 461, 462 (1983).
46. Law of the Sea Convention, supra note 42, art. 3.
47. For the purposes of simplicity, references are made to the "coast" in place of the
more accurate "baseline from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured." While
the baseline may not depart appreciably from the direction of the coast, at some points it
may be a significant distance from the coast itself.
48. Law of the Sea Convention, supra note 42, art. 76.
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importer of the resources concerned.49 Those payments are to be dis-
tributed among parties to the 1982 Convention "on the basis of equita-
ble sharing criteria, taking into account the interests and needs of
developing States." 50
(3) The 1982 Convention permits the coastal state to establish
an exclusive economic zone beyond its territorial sea extending up to
200 miles from the coast.51 Within the economic zone, the coastal
state has
sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring and exploiting, conserving and
managing the natural resources, whether living or non-living, of the waters...
and of the sea-bed and its subsoil, and with regard to other activities for the
economic exploitation and exploration of the zone, such as the production of
energy from the water, currents and winds .... 52
The coastal state also enjoys in the economic zone "the exclusive
right to construct and to authorize and regulate the construction,
operation and use of" artificial islands as well as economic (and some
other) installations and structures;53 rights to be informed of and con-
sent to marine scientific research;54 environmental rights to prescribe
and enforce dumping and internationally approved discharge stan-
dards for foreign ships; 55 and rights to prescribe and enforce environ-
mental standards for foreign ships "in ice-covered areas ...where
particularly severe climatic conditions and the presence of ice covering
such areas for most of the year create obstructions or exceptional
hazards to navigation, and pollution of the marine environment could
cause major harm to or irreversible disturbance of the ecological bal-
ance."' 56 These rights are accompanied by many duties, including the
duty to conserve and promote optimum utilization of living
resources, 57 and the duty to protect and preserve the marine
environment. 58
(4) At the same time, within the exclusive economic zone, all
states continue to enjoy the high seas "freedoms... of navigation and
overflight and of the laying of submarine cables and pipelines, and
other internationally lawful uses of the sea related to these freedoms,
such as those associated with the operation of ships, aircraft and sub-
49. Id., art. 82.
50. Id.
51. Id., art. 57.
52. Id., art. 56, para. l(a).
53. Id., arts. 56, 60, 258.
54. Id., arts. 56, 246-54.
55. Id., arts. 56, 210-11, 216, 220; see id., arts. 223-33.
56. Id., art. 234.
57. Id., arts. 61-62. The duty to promote optimum utilization does not apply to marine
mammals. Id., art. 65. The duty to conserve and promote optimum utilization is not
expressly applicable to sedentary species of the continental shelf. Id., art. 68.
58. Id., arts. 192-96, 208, 210.
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marine cables and pipelines."5 9 These freedoms are accompanied by
many duties, including the duty to protect and preserve the marine
environment. 60
(5) The 1982 Convention contains no definition of the high seas.
All of the rules regarding the high seas apply seaward of the exclusive
economic zone.61 Except for the provisions on fishing and the list of
high seas freedoms, all of the rules regarding the high seas also apply
within the exclusive economic zone "insofar as they are not incompati-
ble with" the provisions regarding the exclusive economic zone.62
(6) The 1982 Convention provides that "rocks which cannot
sustain human habitation or economic life of their own shall have no
exclusive economic zone or continental shelf."63
(7) The 1982 Convention declares the seabed beyond the limits
of national jurisdiction-normally, the seabed beyond the continental
shelf-and its resources to be the "common heritage of mankind." 64
That area is "open to use exclusively for peaceful purposes by all
States. ' 65 Mining by states and private companies is to be authorized
and regulated by an International Seabed Authority, to which miners
are to make payments. 66 The Convention also provides for the estab-
lishment of a commercial "Enterprise" to mine directly for the
Authority.67 The Convention declares, "No State or ... person shall
claim, acquire or exercise rights with respect to the minerals recovered
from the [international seabed] Area except in accordance with this
Part [of the Convention]. Otherwise, no such claim, acquisition or
exercise of such rights shall be recognized. '6
(8) The 1982 Convention reserves all areas beyond the territo-
rial sea for "peaceful purposes.
'69
59. Id., art. 58, para. 1. The full text refers to the "freedoms referred to in article 87 of
navigation .... Article 87 is the basic article on freedom of the high seas. The cross-
reference to article 87 highlights the fact that the freedoms preserved in article 58 are high
seas freedoms.
60. Id., arts. 58(3), 192-96, 210, 211(2), 212, 216, 217, 222.
61. Id., art. 86.
62. Id., art. 58, para. 2. Fishing is excepted because the economic zone articles estab-
lish their own elaborate fisheries regime. The list of high seas freedoms is excepted because
article 58, paragraph 1, contains its own list of freedoms enjoyed by all states in the eco-
nomic zone.
63. Id., art. 121, para. 3.
64. Id., art. 136.
65. Id., art. 141.
66. Id., arts. 153, 159-65; Annex III.
67. Id., art. 170; Annex IV.
68. Id., art. 137, para. 3.
69. Id., arts. 58, 88; see id., arts. 141, 240. The vast geographic application of the
peaceful purposes clause of the Law of the Sea Convention raises questions regarding the
clause's content. Unlike article I of the Antarctic Treaty, the Law of the Sea Convention
contains no arms control measures. See Oxman, The Regime of Warships Under the United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 24 VA. J. INT'L L. 809, 829-32 (1984). One
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B. LEGAL EFFECTS OF THE NEW LAW OF THE SEA
L Coastal State Jurisdiction
Application of the new law of the sea to Antarctica poses the
same basic problem as application of the old law of the sea: coastal
state sovereignty over the territorial sea and coastal state jurisdiction
over the continental shelf and the exclusive economic zone presuppose
the existence of a coastal state.70 In the absence of a coastal state, no
territorial sovereign exists as such to exercise legislative or enforce-
ment competence at sea.
As previously indicated, a number of important states currently
refuse to recognize the validity of existing sovereignty claims to any
part of the Antarctic continent or its adjacent islands. Consequently,
these states do not recognize the existence of jurisidiction over a terri-
torial sea, continental shelf, or exclusive economic zone that is derived
from such claims. Because of the refusal of some states to recognize
territorial claims to Antarctica, and because parts of Antarctica
remain unclaimed, territorial sovereignty cannot provide an agreed
basis for exercising coastal state rights off Antarctica. 71
should bear in mind that various arms control treaties are global in application. These
include the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space, and
Under Water (Nuclear Test Ban Treaty), Aug. 5, 1963, 14 U.S.T. 1313, T.I.A.S. No. 5433,
480 U.N.T.S. 43, and the Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weap-
ons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Seabed and the Ocean Floor and the
Subsoil Thereof (Seabed Arms Control Treaty), Feb. 11, 1971, 23 U.S.T. 701, T.I.A.S. No.
7337. The definition of the area to which the latter Treaty applies and procedures for its
verification are in part dependent on the existence of a coastal state. Id., arts. I, para. 2; II;
III, paras. 2, 3, 6.
70. "The sovereignty of a State extends, beyond its land territory and internal waters,
to a belt of sea adjacent to its coast, described as the territorial sea." Territorial Sea Con-
vention, supra note 36, art. 1, para. 1; Law of the Sea Convention, supra note 42, art. 2,
para. I (with technical changes). "The coastal State exercises over the continental shelf
sovereign rights ...." Convention on the Continental Shelf, supra note 36, art. 2, para. 1;
Law of the Sea Convention, supra note 42, art. 77, para. 1. "In the exclusive economic
zone, the coastal State has... sovereign rights ...." Law of the Sea Convention, supra
note 42, art. 56, para. l(a). The descriptions of the continental shelf and the exclusive
economic zone presume the existence of a territorial sea landward of those areas. Conven-
tion on the Continental Shelf, supra note 36, art. 1; Law of the Sea Convention, supra note
42, art. 55; id., art. 76, para. 1.
The law of piracy treats land areas not subject to the jurisdiction of any state in the same
manner as it treats the high seas. Convention on the High Seas, supra note 36, art. 15, para.
l(b); Law of the Sea Convention, supra note 42, art. 101(a)(2).
71. A different argument could be rooted in article 121, paragraph 3, of the Law of the
Sea Convention, supra note 42, which provides: "Rocks which cannot sustain human
habitation or economic life of their own shall have no exclusive economic zone or continen-
tal shelf." Sovereignty over the rock itself and a territorial sea around the rock are never-
theless assumed. In context, article 121, paragraph 3 distinguishes certain rocks from
"islands" and is not literally applicable to an entire continent. Both habitability and size of
the area involved are relevant criteria. The question is whether the provision reflects some
underlying principle regarding human habitability that limits or excludes coastal state juris-
diction off the Antarctic continent. Given the practice of coastal states that have extensive
coastlines in the Arctic or in other areas that are largely uninhabitable, there appears to be
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The absence of recognized coastal states does not necessarily
mean that the fisheries and mineral resources off the Antarctic coast
are open to unregulated plunder. States may still regulate these
resources by agreement. The key question is: agreement among
which states? The new Antarctic Marine Living Resources Conven-
tion sidesteps the juridical problem by including claimant states and
non-claimant states, and remaining open, at least in principle, to all
states engaged in fishing in the area. The general law of the sea fishing
regimes, applicable in both the exclusive economic zone and on the
high seas beyond, contemplates such cooperation. 72
The underlying juridical question, which may have particular rel-
evance for non-living resources of the continental shelf, is whether a
certain number of states may establish a regulatory regime applicable
erga omnes, i.e., binding all other states. Article X of the Antarctic
Treaty and articles X and XXII of the Antarctic Marine Living
Resources Convention seem to contemplate efforts to secure minimal
acquiescence from non-parties. 73
At least in theory, it is possible to take the position that certain
states-principally the Consultative Parties-have collective rights
applicable erga omnes to establish regulatory regimes for the Antarctic
continent and for offshore areas subject to coastal state jurisdiction
under international law, even if no Consultative Party has perfected a
claim to sovereignty over the land territory in question. Such a posi-
tion could be rooted in the established doctrine of condominium:
whatever the merits of the parties' claims inter sese, their rights collec-
tively are superior to those of the rest of the world. This position
could also be rooted in the theory that the parties, given their historic
role in Antarctica, have a special collective responsibility to establish
such regulatory regimes, particularly in light of the elaborate duties
imposed by the new law of the sea to conserve living resources and to
no such general principle. Yet an intriguing question remains. Almost all of the largely
uninhabitable coastal areas in other parts of the world are physically connected or proxi-
mate to land territory (frequently of the same state) that is habitable. In contrast, arguably
all of Antarctica is not habitable within the meaning of article 121; Antarctica is arguably
the least habitable place on earth. Indeed, the conditions that make Antarctica essentially
uninhabitable, absent extraordinary support efforts, are the source of some of the argu-
ments that deny the validity of the territorial claims on the continent itself. The argument
is that it has not been possible-or was physically impossible-to achieve in Antarctica the
degree of effective occupation required for territorial sovereignty under international law,
at least prior to 1961. See generally Conforti, supra note 2.
72. Law of the Sea Convention, supra note 42, art. 61, paras. 2, 3, 5; art. 62, paras. 2-3;
arts. 63-65, 118.
73. The reference to the U.N. Charter in these articles supports the inference that they
are directed to the activities of other states, rather than persons subject to the jurisdiction of
the parties. Article XXI of the Marine Living Resources Convention, supra note 25, deals
separately with the obligation to ensure compliance by persons subject to the jurisdiction of
the parties.
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protect and preserve the marine environment. The former justification
might suggest that the parties are free to regulate the area primarily
for their own benefit, while the latter justification might suggest a rela-
tionship analogous to a trust for the benefit of all.
Other theoretical approaches are possible and have been elabo-
rated by other speakers at this Conference.74 For the purposes of this
paper, it is sufficient to note that the absence of territorial sovereignty
by any one state is not necessarily dispositive of the question of
whether a suitable group of states may exercise collectively the off-
shore rights that international law normally vests in the coastal state.
2. New Claims and Enlargement of Existing Claims
Under our working definitions, the old law of the sea permitted a
territorial sea of modest breadth and coastal state jurisdiction over the
continental shelf to the limits set in article 1 of the Continental Shelf
Convention. The Antarctic Treaty, however, does not expressly men-
tion either the territorial sea or the continental shelf.
The new law of the sea extends the territorial sea up to a maxi-
mum limit of twelve miles, extends the continental shelf to the edge of
the continental margin or 200 miles from the coast, whichever is fur-
ther seaward, and allows the coastal state to exercise jurisdiction over
a 200-mile exclusive economic zone. The new law of the sea thus per-
mits the coastal state to eliminate previous freedom of fishing, to
restrict previous rights to deploy certain installations and structures,
and to regulate the previous freedom to conduct marine scientific
research. The new law of the sea also allows the coastal state to exer-
cise certain rights over navigation for environmental purposes.
Article IV of the Antarctic Treaty does two things. The first par-
agraph "freezes" the positions of the parties with respect to claims.
The second paragraph prohibits new claims or expansion of existing
claims. Does article IV apply to coastal state jurisdiction over offshore
areas? Article VI of the Antarctic Treaty in principle includes off-
shore areas within the scope of the Treaty. 75 Article IV, however,
refers only to claims of "territorial sovereignty," which might be read
literally to include the territorial sea but not the continental shelf or
the economic zone.
The most sensible interpretation of article IV, paragraph 1, is that
it applies to coastal state rights over all offshore areas, subject to the
74. See Conforti, supra note 2; Simma, supra note 2.
75. Article VI excludes only "the high seas within [the Treaty] area," not all offshore
areas. It can be read as implicitly acknowledging a position by the drafters that territorial
claims include offshore areas excluded from the high seas, namely the territorial sea, or
more broadly include derivative coastal state jurisdiction exercisable in derogation of the
high seas regime, including sovereign rights with respect to the continental shelf.
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high seas exclusion of article VJ.76 Article IV applies not because
those rights are analogous to territorial sovereignty, 77 but because the
right to coastal state jurisdiction is an incident of territorial sover-
eignty that inheres automatically in the coastal state.78 In common
law parlance, it "runs with the land." The fact that article IV of the
Marine Living Resources Convention expressly applies the principles
of article IV, paragraph 1 of the Antarctic Treaty to coastal state juris-
diction at sea suggests that this is the current understanding of the
parties. 79
A contrary view of article IV, paragraph 1 of the Antarctic
Treaty would imply that the Treaty could be interpreted as constitut-
ing a renunciation of offshore rights by the territorial claimants, or as
prejudicing the position of those parties that do not recognize territo-
rial claims. This simply does not make sense. A state that does not
recognize a territorial claim on land need not recognize the coastal
state jurisdiction based on that territorial claim.
The more difficult question is whether the prohibition on new
claims or enlargment of existing claims in the second paragraph of
article IV of the Antarctic Treaty applies to coastal state jurisdiction.
Before reaching this question, one must note that some ambiguity
exists as to what constitutes a new claim or an enlargement of an
existing claim at sea. The 1958 and 1960 Law of the Sea Conferences
failed to agree on the maximum permissible breadth of the territorial
sea. Some states might argue that by 1961, they already had vested
rights under international law over the continental shelf to the outer
edge of the continental margin. Chile already had claimed a 200-mile
zone. Notwithstanding these legal problems, assertion of jurisdiction
over a 200-mile exclusive economic zone and the associated 200-mile
alternative limit for the continental shelf would in fact be new claims
or enlargements of existing claims by most if not all the territorial
claimants. Does article IV prohibit such extensions of coastal state
jurisdiction?
The Marine Living Resources Convention is not entirely clear on
76. The question of whether the high seas exclusion applies to activities subject to
coastal state jurisdiction beyond the territorial sea is addressed infra, Section II(B)(3).
77. The analogy is a particularly poor one in the context of article IV because coastal
state jurisdiction is not acquired by "claim," i.e., by effective occupation, but is acquired as
of right (even if the coastal state is free to claim less than that to which it is entitled as of
right). The exception in the case of prescriptive title to so-called historic bays is a limited
one and, even then, enures only to the benefit of the coastal state.
78. This point is made vividly in connection with the continental shelf: "The rights of
the coastal State over the continental shelf do not depend on occupation, effective or
notional, or on any express proclamation." Convention on the Continental Shelf, supra
note 36, art. 2, para. 3; Law of the Sea Convention, supra note 42, art. 77, para. 3.
79. The changes in wording are not relevant in this regard.
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this point.8 0 The argument that the enlargement of coastal state juris-
diction, in accordance with the new law of the sea, does not violate the
Antarctic Treaty might rest on the premise that, with the exception of
the territorial sea, the new claims are not claims to "territorial sover-
eignty" but to limited jurisdiction beyond the territorial sea. As previ-
ously noted, however, exclusion of offshore jurisdiction from the scope
of article IV of the Antarctic Treaty does not make sense. The more
sophisticated argument is that the territorial claims as they existed in
1959 or 1961 carried with them the incidents of sovereignty that might
emerge under international law in the future, and that increased
coastal state jurisdiction is one such incident. In comparison, the
argument that expansion of coastal state jurisdiction violates the
Treaty adopts the position that the prohibition on new claims or
enlargement of existing claims applies to the incidents of territorial
sovereignty that emerged after 1959 or 1961, or, at the very least, that
were claimed after 1959 or 1961.
Legal merits apart, the view that expansions of coastal state juris-
diction are not prohibited by the Treaty has three practical advan-
tages: (1) it avoids the intertemporal law issue; (2) it avoids the need
to determine what constitutes a new or enlarged claim; and (3) it per-
mits the parties to deal with all coastal state claims in the same way.
Under this approach, the Treaty accurately reflects the status quo:
claimants may recognize their own and each other's claimed offshore
jurisdiction, while those who reject the territorial claims may refuse to
recognize any derivative coastal state jurisdiction. This approach also
serves as a salutary reminder that the express or implicit recognition of
claims either to the continent itself or to offshore jurisdiction may
vastly reduce international cooperative efforts to protect continental
and marine areas for environmental or other purposes.
It may be that the underlying purposes of the Antarctic Treaty
are best served if legal issues relating to territorial claims remain in
dispute, thereby encouraging the parties to reach practical accommo-
dations with each other. Thus I would hesitate, and urge others to
hesitate, before taking a definitive position on the issue of expansions
of coastal state jurisdiction that could be perceived-whatever the
80. The Marine Living Resources Convention repeats the Antarctic Treaty's prohibi-
tion on new or enlarged claims in a Convention that applies only to marine living resources.
If the prohibition is not applicable to coastal state jurisdiction, and is fully incorporated by
reference to article IV of the Antarctic Treaty in the previous paragraph, why repeat it?
On the other hand, although the Convention substitutes the words "coastal state jurisdic-
tion" for the words "territorial sovereignty" in other provisions copied from the Antarctic
Treaty, it does not change these words in connection with this particular prohibition.
Marine Living Resources Convention, supra note 25, art. IV, paras. 1, 2(d); cf id., paras.
2(b)-(c) (referring to "coastal state jurisdiction").
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intent-as indirect acceptance of the territorial claims on which
coastal state jurisdiction is based.
A related, but distinct, issue is whether coastal states may extend
their offshore jurisdiction into the Treaty area-that is, south of 60
South latitude-to the limits permitted under the new law of the sea,
where such limits are measured from land territory located outside the
Antarctic Treaty area. The issue arises only if one concludes that
extensions of coastal state jurisdiction based on sovereignty claims
within the Treaty area are prohibited. The advent of the exclusive
economic zone and the expansive definition of the continental shelf
make this a more important question than it may have been in the
past.
An argument can be made that the prohibition on new or
enlarged claims does not apply to territorial sovereignty outside the
Treaty area, and therefore does not apply to the incidents of that sov-
ereignty, including coastal state jurisdiction extending into the Treaty
area. A more persuasive argument can be made that the Antarctic
Treaty provisions regarding claims make no such distinction and
require application in the same manner throughout the Treaty area
whether or not those claims are rooted in territorial sovereignty
outside the Treaty area. Some of the claims to the Antarctic continent
itself rely in part on a "sector" principle or some principle emphasiz-
ing proximity.81
Finally, it might be argued that claims to deep seabed mining sites
seaward of the continental shelf, but south of 60* South latitude, con-
stitute new claims prohibited by article IV. In fact, neither existing
national legislation, which is based on high seas principles and recipro-
cal recognition of exclusivity, nor the Law of the Sea Convention rec-
ognizes claims of national jurisdiction over the site. The question of
deep seabed mining is properly analyzed under article VI of the
Antarctic Treaty rather than article IV.
3. Scope of Application of the Antarctic Treaty
Article VI of the Antarctic Treaty provides:
[T]he... Treaty shall apply to the area south of 60* South latitude, including
all ice shelves, but nothing in the present Treaty shall prejudice or in any way
affect the rights, or the exercise of the rights, of any State under international
law with regard to the high seas within that area. 82
Article VI addresses the scope of the Treaty's application, not national
claims. The high seas exclusion leaves the use of the high seas, by
parties as well as non-parties, unaffected by other provisions of the
81. For a description of these principles, see Conforti, supra note 2.
82. Antarctic Treaty, Appendix, infra, art. VI.
1986]
228 CORNELL INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL
Treaty, including the arms control provisions.83
Under the old law of the sea, "The term 'high seas' means all
parts of the sea that are not included in the territorial sea or in the
internal waters of a State."'8 4 Application of this definition to article
VI of the Antarctic Treaty would have raised three issues. The first
issue concerns the maximum permissible breadth of the territorial sea
under international law. The new law of the sea presumably resolves
that issue by confining the breadth of the territorial sea to a maximum
of twelve miles.. 5 The second issue is whether, from the perspective of
states that do not recognize territorial claims in Antarctica, all marine
areas adjacent to Antarctica are high seas. This position assumes that
no coastal state exists to exercise sovereignty over a territorial sea or
other forms of jurisdiction beyond the territorial sea. The third issue
is whether the continental shelf is covered by the high seas exclusion.
The latter two issues also arise under the new law of the sea.
The advent of the exclusive economic zone in the new law of the
sea complicates matters further. The 1982 Law of the Sea Convention
contains no definition of the high seas. The 1982 Convention replaces
the definition with provisions indicating where and to what extent
high seas law applies.
Article 86 of the 1982 Convention applies all the rules of high
seas law seaward of the exclusive economic zone. It expressly pro-
vides, however, that this entails no abridgement of the freedoms
enjoyed by all states in the exclusive economic zone pursuant to article
58.
Article 58, paragraph 1 preserves a number of high seas rights in
the exclusive economic zone. These rights include the high seas free-
doms of navigation, overflight, and the laying of submarine cables and
pipelines, as well as other internationally lawful uses related to these
freedoms. Article 58's express cross-reference to article 87 (the basic
article describing the freedom of the high seas) emphasizes that the
freedoms preserved in the exclusive economic zone are qualitatively
the same as those freedoms existing on the high seas. The cross-refer-
ence was intended to preserve the effect in the exclusive economic zone
of existing treaties regulating or otherwise dealing with high seas free-
doms; for example, the cross-reference preserves high seas aviation
rules in the exclusive economic zone under the ICAO Convention. 86
83. See, e.g., id., arts. I, V.
84. Convention on the High Seas, supra note 36, art. 1.
85. Law of the Sea Convention, supra note 42, art. 3.
86. Convention on International Civil Aviation, Dec. 7, 1944, T.I.A.S. No. 1591, 15
U.N.T.S. 295 (entered into force Apr. 4, 1947).
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Article 58, paragraph 2 applies all non-fisheries rules of high seas
law to the exclusive economic zone to the extent they do not conflict
with the provisions regarding the exclusive economic zone.87
An attempt to sort through the maze of alternatives regarding the
meaning of the high seas exclusion in article VI of the Antarctic
Treaty requires consideration of the principal consequences of not
applying the Treaty to a particular area: (1) the arms control and
related inspection provisions would not apply; (2) the prohibition on
nuclear explosions and disposal of radioactive waste would not apply;
(3) the provisions regarding freedom of scientific research, exchange of
scientific information and personnel, and related jurisdictional provi-
sions would not apply; and (4) environmental and other "agreed meas-
ures" adopted by the Consultative Parties probably would not apply.88
The first issue is whether states that do not recognize territorial
claims in Antarctica would be justified in taking the position that all of
the marine areas south of 60* South latitude are high seas outside the
scope of the Treaty's regulation. 89 From the perspective of a state that
87. The enumeration of high seas freedoms in article 87 is not incorporated in article
58, paragraph 2, because paragraph 1 of that article contains its own enumeration of the
freedoms preserved in the exclusive economic zone and its own cross-reference to article
87. See supra notes 59, 62.
88. Since the agreed measures must be approved by the governments of the Consulta-
tive Parties, it can be argued that, at least among those governments, the measures have the
status of a new agreement that is not necessarily limited by the scope of the Antarctic
Treaty. However, absent express provision to the contrary, the geographic scope of the
agreed measures adopted pursuant to the Treaty would normally be interpreted in light of
the geographic scope of the Treaty. Moreover, in practice, some governments may be
reluctant to "delegate" more negotiating power to their participants in the consultative
meetings than they believe is provided for in the Antarctic Treaty itself.
89. The related question of whether all seabed areas off Antarctica would, under a
"high seas" approach, fall within the definition of the international seabed "Area" of the
Law of the Sea Convention is complex. Article 1(1) of the Convention defines the "Area"
as the seabed "beyond the limits of national jurisdiction." This may be read as referring to
the permissible maximum limits of coastal state jurisdiction under the Convention-that is,
200 miles or the edge of the continental margin-rather than to the actual existence of
coastal state jurisdiction over the continental shelf in a particular case. Such a reading
renders the dispute over the status of the land areas in Antarctica irrelevant to the issue of
whether the continental shelf off Antarctica falls within the definition of the international
seabed "Area." This interpretation is supported by the underlying view that the broad
limits of the continental shelf were drawn not only to include virtually all known hydrocar-
bon potential within coastal state jurisdiction, but also to exclude most hydrocarbons from
the international seabed "Area," thus avoiding further complication of an already difficult
and controversial negotiation over polymetallic nodules. For example, the Conference
might have suffered political collapse if proposals for production controls to benefit existing
minerals producers were believed to include significant hydrocarbon deposits. Article 134,
paragraphs 3 and 4 of the Law of the Sea Convention establish a direct link between the
limits of the international seabed "Area" and the limits of the continental shelf. The cross-
reference to the continental shelf articles in paragraph 3 emerged from the Drafting Com-
mittee. While that would indicate that it was not regarded as a substantive change, since
the Drafting Committee was precluded from dealing with matters of substance, it could be
read as supporting the underlying interpretation of the definition of the "Area" referred to
above. In this connection, it might be noted that representatives of some of the Antarctic
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is not a Consultative Party, or at least a party to the Antarctic Treaty,
onc can see some potential logic in such a position. But from the per-
spective of a party to the Treaty, particularly a Consultative Party, the
position makes little sense. The claimants will take the position that
their territorial sea and other offshore jurisdictional claims are valid.
The real issues, therefore, are whether the claimants are subject to
the restraints of the Antarctic Treaty with respect to their claimed
jurisdiction, and whether agreed measures can be adopted by all the
Consultative Parties with respect to the exercise of that jurisdiction.
Cooperative regulation seems a more palatable result to claimants
than no accepted regulation at all, and a more palatable result to non-
claimants than a claimant's attempts to regulate unilaterally. Territo-
rial claimants cannot plausibly maintain that the territorial seas adja-
cent to claimed territory are excluded from the Treaty as high seas.
This leads to a preliminary conclusion that the high seas exclusion of
article VI at the least does not apply to areas that could be regarded as
part of the territorial sea under international law.
The second issue is whether the high seas exclusion covers all
areas beyond the territorial sea in all respects or only with respect to
the high seas freedoms enjoyed by all states. As of 1959, this issue
concerned mainly the sovereign rights of the coastal state with respect
to the continental shelf. Today, the issue implicates both the continen-
tal shelf and the exclusive economic zone.
The language of article VI suggests that only the rights and free-
doms enjoyed by all states on the high seas are excluded, and not the
rights enjoyed only by the coastal state. The exclusion refers to "the
rights ... of any State under international law with regard to the high
seas. . .. "90
Treaty Consultative Parties cooperated informally in prepanng paragraph 3 for submission
to the Drafting Committee.
These representatives also considered the deletion of the words "of a coastal State" in the
definition of the continental shelf in article 76, paragraph 1. The words are unnecessary:
they are not included in the definition set forth in article 1 of the Convention on the Conti-
nental Shelf; the sovereign rights of the coastal state over the continental shelf are estab-
lished by article 77. The deletion of these words would have eliminated one possible textual
basis for an argument that any cross-reference to the limits of the continental shelf in the
definition of the international seabed "Area" operates only if there is a coastal state entitled
to exercise jurisdiction. However, for unexplained reasons, a South American representa-
tive refused in the informal discussions to agree to the deletion.
It also might be noted that while representatives of the Consultative Parties did on occa-
sion work together at the Law of the Sea Conference, the primary objective of that coordi-
nation was to prevent any discussion at the Conference of Antarctic issues or the
relationship between the law of the sea and Antarctica. In this respect, the representatives
succeeded. The Conference worked on global rules of the law of the sea, applicable off
Antarctica as well as all other areas; the Conference did not address the specific question of
how those global rules are to be applied off Antarctica.
90. Antarctic Treaty, Appendix, infra, art. VI.
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Article VI is properly understood as a denial to the Antarctic
Treaty parties collectively of powers that no coastal state could law-
fully exercise individually. It need not and should not exclude from
the Treaty matters that may be regulated lawfully by a coastal state.
The sophisticated status of the exclusive economic zone merely con-
firms the propriety of such a functional interpretation. The exclusive
economic zone is treated like the high seas for some purposes but is
treated much like the territorial sea for others. A geographic rather
than a functional reading of the article VI high seas exclusion requires
that either the coastal or the high seas aspects of the exclusive eco-
nomic zone regime be ignored. Yet the functional combination of
those aspects is the essence of that regime.91
Even if article VI excludes only high seas rights and freedoms
enjoyed by all states, the intertemporal law problem remains: as of
what date does article VI apply? Again, the text of article VI itself
suggests the answer. Article VI refers to rights "under international
law." Absent indication of a contrary intent, it seems implausible to
assume that the parties desired to freeze the reference to international
law as of 1959.92 Such an interpretation also would require intricate
determinations of the nature and extent of coastal state jurisdiction
permitted under international law in 1959. The most sensible reading
of the article VI reference to rights under international law is that its
content changes as international law evolves. It should be read today
as referring to high seas rights and freedoms under the new law of the
sea.
Under this approach, the Antarctic Treaty applies to the explora-
tion and exploitation of natural resources, marine scientific research,
offshore installations, and regulation of pollution from ships in the
exclusive economic zone and on the continental shelf, to the extent
that these matters are subject to coastal state jurisdiction under the
new law of the sea. The Treaty does not apply to navigation, over-
flight, the laying of submarine cables and pipelines, or other high seas
rights and freedoms enjoyed by all states under international law.
91. See Law of the Sea Convention, supra note 42, art. 55.
92. This is particularly true in light of the fact that at least Argentina and Chile did not
at all agree with some of the premises accepted by the 1958 Conference on the Law of the
Sea. Unless the delegates in fact knew something about the law of the sea, it is not plausible
to assume they intended to freeze the content of that law as of 1959. If they did know
something about the law of the sea, then they also knew that there were important substan-
tive disagreements among them on the subject. This makes it highly unlikely that they
could have agreed on what principles of the law of the sea they were freezing. The absence
of any reference to the continental shelf in the Antarctic Treaty tends to confirm this view,
although its absence could also be attributed to the fact that the Convention does not
address questions of mineral development on land.
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The question of the seabed beyond the continental shelf is prop-
erly addressed in this context. Several freedoms of the high seas, such
as anchoring, laying submarine cables and pipelines, and constructing
installations and structures, apply to the seabed. 93 Article VI excludes
these freedoms from the Antarctic Treaty. The question remains,
however, whether article VI also excludes mining of seabed resources
beyond the continental shelf but south of 60* South latitude. States
that have enacted national laws governing deep seabed mining proceed
on the premise that such mining is a freedom of the high seas; this
premise would exclude deep seabed mining from the Antarctic Treaty.
Part XI of the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention expressly sets
forth a deep seabed mining regime different in important respects from
a high seas approach. A major underlying premise of the 1982 Con-
vention's regime, however, duplicates the premise applicable on the
high seas: the seabed beyond coastal state jurisdiction is open to all
states without discrimination. 94 Accordingly, the 1982 Convention's
approach to deep seabed mining also brings that activity within the
high seas exclusion of article VI of the Antarctic Treaty under a func-
tional interpretation of the exclusion.
Nevertheless, under the 1982 Convention, deep seabed mining is
subject to consultation with the coastal state and to its environmental
rights under certain circumstances. 95 It would be appropriate to con-
clude that the parties to the Antarctic Treaty collectively may exercise
these coastal state rights.
Finally, it should be noted that the only exclusion from the
Treaty south of 60* South latitude mentioned in article VI relates to
rights on the high seas. Assuming that in principle the Treaty applies
to activities subject to coastal state jurisdiction, there is no direct tex-
tual basis for arguing that the Treaty nevertheless does not apply to
areas south of 60* South latitude over which coastal states exercise
jurisdiction on the basis of their sovereignty over land areas north of
that latitude. If the sole purpose of the Antarctic Treaty were to
achieve a modus vivendi with respect to areas where sovereignty
claims are disputed, it could be argued that undisputed claims fall
outside the ambit of the Treaty. However, this was not the sole pur-
pose of the Treaty.
The issue of whether collective regulatory measures apply to
areas of offshore jurisdiction measured from land areas of uncontested
sovereignty arose in the Conference on the Conservation of Antarctic
Marine Living Resources. The Final Act of that conference accords
93. See Law of the Sea Convention, supra note 42, art. 87.
94. Id., art. 141; see id., art. 87.
95. Id., art. 142.
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somewhat special treatment to waters adjacent to the French islands
of Kerguelen and Crozet and adjacent to those islands "over which the
existence of State sovereignty is recognized by all Contracting Parties"
and that are within the area to which the Marine Living Resources
Convention applies (which is broader than the Antarctic Treaty
area).96 No clear principle emerges from the result.
Distinguishing between offshore jurisdiction based on territorial
claims inside the Treaty area and offshore jurisdiction based on terri-
tory outside the Treaty area might prove exceedingly complex. This is
particularly true where the same state is involved on both "sides."
Moreover, attempts to distinguish between the treatment accorded dis-
puted and undisputed claims could make it more difficult for states
with disputed claims to justify cooperative regulatory arrangements to
domestic constituencies on grounds other than the fact that their
claims are contested.
Thus, we may conclude that neither a literal nor a practical read-
ing of article VI requires different treatment of disputed and undis-
puted claims. Perhaps the most fruitful approach would be to treat all
claims to coastal state jurisdiction within the Treaty area in the same
manner whatever their origin but, as under the Marine Living
Resources Convention, make practical accommodations where mer-
ited that do not prejudice the underlying Antarctic regulatory system.
4. Conservation and Environmental Protection
One of the hallmarks of the new law of the sea is its emphasis on
conservation and environmental obligations. Conservation measures
must take into account the interdependence of stocks.97 Protection of
the marine environment requires a broad approach that includes pro-
tection of the various ecosystems and habitats of marine life.98 The
Marine Living Resources Convention exemplifies this approach. The
Convention applies to the entire Antarctic ecosystem south of the
Antarctic convergence, and places great emphasis on the relationship
between species and the protection of the ecosystem as a whole.
96. Final Act of the Conference on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living
Resources, 19 I.L.M. 837, 838-39 (1980). The Final Act confers on France the power to
regulate the waters adjacent to the French islands. Under the Final Act, measures for the
conservation of Antarctic marine living resources adopted by France prior to the entry into
force of the Marine Living Resources Convention remain in force until modified by France.
Id., art. I, para. 1. The Final Act also allows France to determine whether specific conser-
vation measures will apply to the waters adjacent to the French islands. Id., art. I, para. 2.
Finally, the Act provides that France may promulgate national measures stricter than
those measures enacted pursuant to the Convention. Id., art. I, para. 3. The Final Act
specifies that France shall enforce all conservation measures. Id., art. I, para. 4. See supra
note 25 and accompanying text.
97. Id., art. 61, paras. 3-4; art. 119.
98. Id., arts. 194, 196.
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The new law of the sea also places substantial environmental
duties on coastal states with respect to the development of seabed
resources and offshore installations. The states currently engaged in
negotiations regarding Antarctic mineral resources appear to be quite
willing to fulfill these environmental duties.
The exercise of coastal state environmental powers over ships
poses a complex problem. Under article VI, the Antarctic Treaty may
not affect the freedom of navigation. Yet an attempt to adopt special
regulations for navigation in ice-covered areas by ships not entitled to
sovereign immunity, to the extent permitted by the law of the sea,
could and presumably would be intended to have a profound effect on
navigation. In my view, the proper reading of article VI is that the
Treaty may not affect high seas freedoms to the extent that a coastal
state lacks the competence to affect those freedoms under international
law. Thus, the parties could adopt collective environmental measures
with respect to navigation in the area to the extent that a coastal state
is entitled to do so. Moreover, nothing in high seas law prevents flag
states from agreeing among themselves to observe special measures.
In addition, observance of such measures could be made a condition
for access to the continent or its mineral resources.
Those concerned with freedom of navigation may initially shrink
from this broad reading of the Consultative Parties' collective powers
to regulate pollution from ships. They might bear in mind, however,
that the adoption of agreed measures under the Treaty requires the
approval of all the Consultative Parties, and that the existence of an
environmental hazard that is not controlled collectively could inspire
more vigorous unilateral efforts by territorial claimants, which might
destabilize the entire Treaty system. To the extent one contemplates
the development of hydrocarbons in Antarctica, the environmental
risks arising not only from their extraction but from their transport
must be addressed.
5. Revenue Sharing From the Continental Shelf
Article 82 of the Law of the Sea Convention requires a coastal
state to make modest payments in respect of the production of non-
living resources from the continental shelf seaward of 200 miles, unless
the coastal state is a developing country and a net importer of the
resource concerned. "The payments ... shall be made through the
[Seabed] Authority, which shall distribute them to States Parties to
this Convention, on the basis of equitable sharing criteria, taking into
account the interests and needs of developing States. . .."99
99. Id., art. 82(4).
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A state that is a party to the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention and
a territorial claimant would, from its perspective, be subject to this
obligation, at least if that state administered the area itself. On the
other hand, a state that does not recognize the territorial claims in
Antarctica might argue that the revenue-sharing obligation is a con-
comitant duty imposed as a direct quid pro quo for broad coastal state
rights over the continental margin seaward of 200 miles, and does not
apply where there is no coastal state jurisdiction as such.
A state that is not party to the Law of the Sea Convention might
argue that, even if most of the Convention's rules regarding coastal
state jurisdiction are declarations of customary international law bind-
ing all states, the continental shelf revenue-sharing obligation is not
customary international law, but rather is a purely "contractual"
arrangement among the parties. Alternatively, a state that is not party
to the Law of the Sea Convention might argue that a general revenue-
sharing obligation may exist in principle under international law, but
that the precise details set forth in the Convention-in particular, the
mode of distribution of revenues-are binding only on the parties,
because non-parties would have no voice in the manner in which the
Seabed Authority decided to effect the distribution.
Assuming the negotiation of some international system to regu-
late the exploitation of continental shelf resources in Antarctica, the
question will arise whether an Antarctic minerals regime will be
designed to generate any net public revenues from miners even within
200 miles and, if so, how the revenues will be distributed. If, as is
proposed later in this paper, any such revenues were dedicated to
research and environmental protection in Antarctica-i.e., to purposes
that benefit the international community as a whole-it can be argued
that the purpose, if not the letter, of the international revenue-sharing
obligation with respect to the continental shelf beyond 200 miles
would be fulfilled.
Revenue-sharing from the areas seaward of 200 miles is an issue
that those negotiating the Antarctic minerals regime might profitably
leave undecided for now. Development of the Antarctic continental
shelf seaward of 200 miles is not imminent. The revenue-sharing obli-
gation would first attach five years after commercial production begins
at any given site. 100 By that time, a clearer picture may emerge of the
extent of ratification of the Law of the Sea Convention and the prac-
tice of states that are not party to the Convention with respect to the
revenue-sharing obligation.
100. Id., art. 82(2).
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6. Summary of Legal Effects
The Antarctic Treaty does not preclude the exercise of coastal
state jurisdiction south of 60* South latitude to the extent permitted by
the new law of the sea. Whether an individual coastal state may exer-
cise that jurisdiction depends on one's position regarding that state's
sovereignty claim to the land areas from which such jurisdiction is
measured and, in part, on one's interpretation of the prohibition on
new or expanded claims. Moreover, insistence on exercising jurisdic-
tion measured from land areas of uncontested sovereignty could make
it more difficult for states with contested claims to justify cooperative
regulatory arrangements. The view that a particular state is entitled to
exercise coastal state jurisdiction does not preclude that state from
entering into the international arrangements regarding the subject
matter of its regulatory competence.
The law of the sea does not preclude certain states, such as the
Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties, from collectively exercising
coastal state jurisdiction to the extent a coastal state may exercise such
jurisdiction under the law of the sea. Whether the collective exercise
of jurisdiction is valid erga omnes depends on one's view of the status
of the land areas from which such jurisdiction is measured. If, with
respect to the continent, one recognizes individual sovereignty or some
sort of collective condominium, or accepts the principle of the collec-
tive responsibility of the states concerned, then the same approach
could extend seaward to the limits of coastal state jurisdiction.
The Antarctic Treaty applies to all activities of the parties south
of 60* South latitude except for the exercise of high seas freedoms rec-
ognized in the new law of the sea and deep seabed mining seaward of
the continental shelf. The Treaty parties, however, are not precluded
from collectively exercising the environmental rights accorded coastal
states by the new law of the sea with respect to navigation and deep
seabed mining.
The conclusion that the Antarctic Treaty applies to offshore
activities subject to coastal state jurisdiction does not mean that those
activities must be regulated, if at all, only under the Antarctic Treaty.
Antarctic seals and, more generally, Antarctic marine living resources
are regulated under separate but related treaties.
The conclusion that the Antarctic Treaty does not apply to high
seas freedoms does not mean that those freedoms are not regulated by
general international law or treaties of general application, or cannot
be regulated further by agreement. The new law of the sea contains
elaborate environmental and conservation obligations that apply to all
flag states. Various pollution and arms control treaties also apply uni-
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versally. Whaling is regulated by a commission with global
responsibilities.
C. POLITICAL EFFECTS OF THE NEW LAW OF THE SEA
The fundamental political question posed by the new law of the
sea is participation. The idea of the "common heritage of mankind,"
developed with respect to deep seabed mining, suggests at least some
qualities of universal participation. 10 1
The question of participation may be examined from three differ-
ent perspectives: (1) participation in the regulation of activities; (2)
participation in the conduct of activities, including the question of
rights of access and the question of assistance in exercising those
rights; and (3) participation in the benefits of activities.
1. Participation in Regulation
The basic approach to international regulation applied in Antarc-
tica until now is the same functional approach that was classically
applied to high seas fisheries. Regulatory power is vested in interested
states. Interested states are those in the immediate vicinity and those
conducting activities that are the object of the regulation. 02
With respect to most matters, the new law of the sea does not
contradict this functional approach to participation in regulation. The
1982 Convention specifically confirms this functional approach for the
regulation of fisheries.10 3
101. See Francioni, supra note 1.
102. Examples of such regulation include the following:
(1) Article IX of the Antarctic Treaty limits participation in the consultative meetings to
the original Treaty parties (who include the territorial claimants, the southern hemisphere
states in the vicinity, and a few other states with historic ties to Antarctica) and to other
Treaty parties during such time as they conduct substantial scientific research in
Antarctica.
(2) The Seal Convention, supra note 24, under articles 10 and 12, is open only to the
states that negotiated the Convention and to such other states as may accede with the
consent of the other parties.
(3) The Marine Living Resources Convention, supra note 25, contains numerous deferen-
tial references to the Antarctic Treaty and to the agreed measures adopted under that
Treaty, and incorporates by reference certain basic provisions of the Treaty. Article V of
the Convention specifically recognizes the "special obligations and responsibilities of the
Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties for the protection and preservation of the environ-
ment of the Antarctic Treaty area." Article VII of the Convention limits membership in
the regulatory commission to the original parties and other parties during such time as they
are engaged in research or harvesting activities with respect to the resources regulated.
This determination is left to a decision of the existing members that may require consensus.
(4) Article X of the Antarctic Treaty and articles X and XXII of the Marine Living
Resources Convention contemplate efforts to secure the acquiescence of states that are not
parties to those treaties.
103. Law of the Sea Convention, supra note 42, arts. 61(5), 63(2), 64(l), 66, 118, 123.
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With respect to seabed minerals, however, a new approach
emerged in the 1982 Convention. By virtue of the very broad defini-
tion of the continental shelf, the Convention placed most important
non-living seabed resources, including almost all known hydrocarbon
potential, under coastal state jurisdiction.' °4 However, the remaining
non-living seabed resources were not left for functional regulation by
the states engaged in or affected by the mining activity. Rather, the
Convention subjected these resources to regulation by a universal
organization, the International Seabed Authority.
Nevertheless, the 1982 Convention manifests the idea of func-
tional participation in regulation to some degree in the structure and
voting rules of the Council of the Seabed Authority. The Council is
accorded effective control over virtually all regulatory decisions. 05
Interested states enjoy semi-vested positions on the Council and veto
power over major decisions that must be taken by consensus, but they
do not have the affirmative power to make regulatory decisions on
their own. 1 6
The Convention prohibits the parties from entering into agree-
ments with each other in derogation of the common heritage principle.
Interested parties are not precluded, however, from entering other
agreements compatible with the Convention that do not affect third-
party rights. 10 7
The deep seabed mining system of the Convention may be seen as
a compromise between the idea of universal participation in regulation
and the idea of functional participation in regulation by directly inter-
ested states. By contrast, the deep seabed mining agreements entered
into by several industrial states proceed on a functional premise, albeit
imperfectly realized. 08 The parties are states whose nationals are
interested in conducting deep seabed mining, but the arrangements do
not include all such states: Canada, India, and the U.S.S.R. are nota-
ble non-participants.
The deep seabed mining experiment at the Law of the Sea Confer-
ence undoubtedly played a role in stimulating interest in Antarctic
mineral resources in the United Nations General Assembly. As the
Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties struggle to deal with mineral
resources, the uncertain level of expectation of universal participation
in regulation poses a threat to their functional monopoly. Deflecting
this threat is probably one of the reasons the Consultative Parties have
acquiesced in a modest expansion of their number.
104. Id., arts. 76-77.
105. Id., art. 162.
106. Id., art. 161.
107. Id., art. 311, paras. 2, 6.
108. See supra note 44.
[Vol. 19:211
ANTARCTICA AND LAW OF THE SEA
The threat to the functional monopoly presents a particularly
serious problem for two types of Treaty parties: the claimant states
and the states potentially interested in exploiting Antarctic minerals.
The former would find it difficult to accommodate their claims with
the idea of universal regulation. The latter would fear that their access
to resources would fall under the political control of U.N. voting
majorities.10 9
Indeed, a close examination of the types of solutions that may
emerge from discussions among the Consultative Parties may reveal
that potential exploiters would rather give the Soviet Union considera-
ble power over Western access to Antarctic energy and mineral
resources than deal with the Third World over Western access to deep
seabed manganese nodules. Some may find such a result anomalous:
if the United States and some of its allies do not have a vital interest in
politically unimpeded access to Antarctic energy reserves, it is difficult
to understand why they have an overwhelming interest in politically
unimpeded access to deep seabed nickel. The anomoly thus suggests
that the true objections to the deep seabed mining regime of the Law
of the Sea Convention had little to do with politically unimpeded
access to resources. Rather, the objections were to ideologically offen-
sive rhetoric and, at least in some quarters, to the very idea of univer-
sal participation in regulation. However, I have little doubt that
government officials could offer an elegant explanation of the reasons
why such comparisons are unwarranted.
In considering the question of participation in regulation, one
must bear in mind that strong impetus for strict universalist control
over deep seabed minerals came from states that produce similar min-
erals on land. These states won semi-vested positions on the Council
of the Seabed Authority as well as mandatory production controls in
the Convention. 110 Notwithstanding the high cost of Antarctic opera-
tions, one could well imagine current oil-exporting nations worrying,
if only slightly, about the effects of an Antarctic oil discovery. Were
these states admitted to the Antarctic regulatory "club," currently
composed largely of net importers of energy, the exporters might, at
the least, disfavor a pro-production regime.
Some environmentalists might welcome opposition to develop-
ment for any reasons. However, from a consumer's perspective (and
most people in the world are direct or indirect consumers of hydrocar-
bons), the possibility of economically motivated pressures to restrict
109. See Hayashi, The Antarctica Question in the United Nations, 19 CORNELL INT'L
L.J. 275 (1986).
110. Lav of the Sea Convention, supra note 42, arts. 151, 161(1)(c).
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production constitutes a significant argument against universal partici-
pation in the regulation of Antarctic mineral resources.
The regulatory mechanism developed by the Law of the Sea Con-
ference for deep seabed mining is sometimes regarded as an implemen-
tation of the "New International Economic Order" demanded by
developing countries. As the discussion on participation in regulation
suggests, the rhetoric of the New International Economic Order may
have a negative long-term impact on the acceptability of the idea of
universal participation in the regulation of mineral production from
other areas, including Antarctica. At the least, the major role
assumed by minerals exporters at the Law of the Sea Conference casts
doubt on the acceptability to major consumers of universal participa-
tion in minerals regulation.
2. Participation in the Conduct of Activities
Neither the Antarctic Treaty nor the two related conservation
treaties declare that Antarctica and its resources are open to use by
all.1 1' At the same time, those treaties contemplate the possibility of
new entrants, at least with respect to scientific research-and fishing.
While it is uncertain how many new entrants the Consultative Parties
would welcome, the liberal idea of equality of opportunity to conduct
activities in Antarctica is not necessarily excluded, at least for the
nationals of other states if not for the states themselves. The potential
political difficulty arises because participation by nationals in the con-
duct of activities is the functional criterion applied under the existing
Antarctic treaties to determine a state's right to participate in collec-
tive regulation of those activities.
The practical question of access to Antarctic mineral resources
should not prove too difficult for the Consultative Parties. Most enter-
prises with the technical capacity to conduct hydrocarbon and mineral
activities in Antarctica are nationals of one of the Consultative Parties
or their close allies, or have other close ties to one of the Consultative
Parties. Moreover, it would be difficult to conduct such activities
without support facilities in nearby southern hemisphere states; those
states, too, are Consultative Parties.
The key legal question is whether an enterprise conducting activi-
ties must be incorporated under the laws of a Treaty party, must have
a minimal "genuine link" with a Treaty party under whose authority it
111. Article VI of the Antarctic Treaty disclaims any prejudice to the rights "of any
State under international law with regard to the high seas within [the Treaty] area." This
right of access for all states derives from general international law, not from the Antarctic
Treaty itself. The reference to freedom of scientific research in article II of the Treaty
might be read as applying to non-parties.
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purports to function, or must have more substantial contacts with a
Treaty party. Acceptance of supervision by one of the Treaty parties
undoubtedly can be made a condition for access to minerals. That
condition can be satisfied easily by the formation of a corporate sub-
sidiary. Therefore, the real issue is whether the parties wish to exclude
outside companies or wish to pressure the outside companies' states of
nationality to become party to the relevant treaty.
An attempt to discriminate formally against outside companies is
largely unnecessary for the practical reasons discussed. Such discrimi-
nation would also call into question the theory that the Antarctic
Treaty Consultative Parties are merely exercising a special responsibil-
ity in Antarctica for the benefit of all.
The desire to encourage universal ratification of the Law of the
Sea Convention may have led some delegates to prefer substantial
restrictions on access to deep seabed resources for nationals of non-
parties. 112 Universal ratification, however, has not been a major objec-
tive of the Antarctic treaties, and does not appear necessary to fulfill
the purposes of those treaties.
Accordingly, it would appear sensible for the parties to take a
relatively liberal view of which companies have the nationality of a
state party, as long as that party has juridical control over the com-
pany's activities in and with respect to Antarctica. Incorporation of a
subsidiary under the laws of a party, perhaps with some minimal "gen-
uine link" thought necessary to confer nationality under international
law, should be sufficient. Thus, the result would be a mining regime in
which access in principle is open to all, subject to regulation under a
nondiscriminatory treaty regime and a link with a treaty party suffi-
cient to allow that party to enforce relevant Antarctic regulations.
The deep seabed mining regime of the Law of the Sea Convention
is not universalist merely in its declaration of open access to all in
accordance with the liberal idea of equal opportunity for those with
112. Article 153, paragraph 2(b) of the Law of the Sea Convention indicates that either
nationality of, or effective control by, a party is necessary for access to deep seabed
resources. However, Annex 3, article IV, paragraph 3, provides that if "the applicant is
effectively controlled by another State Party or its nationals .... both States Parties shall
sponsor the application." This raises not only the question of whether mere incorporation
is sufficient for nationality in the absence of a more substantial "genuine link," but also the
question of whether nationality under either standard is sufficient if the company is effec-
tively controlled by a non-party or its nationals. Resolution II, paragraph l(a)(ii), adopted
by the Law of the Sea Conference with respect to preparatory investment in pioneer activi-
ties, suggests that either nationality or effective control is sufficient where private compa-
nies are concerned. Final Act of the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the
Sea, Annex 1, Res. 2, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/121, reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 1245, 1254
(1982). The Soviet Union abstained on the final vote on the Convention and Resolutions as
a whole because it felt this provision of Resolution II discriminated against state corpora-
tions and in favor of American private companies in particular.
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the capacity to exploit. The Convention's universalist approach goes
further to require technology transfer and a reservation of mine sites.
The purpose of these requirements is specifically to stimulate partici-
pation in mining by all states, either directly or through a universal
mining "Enterprise."'1 13
If one carefully distinguishes participation in the conduct of activ-
ities from participation in the regulation or benefits of activities, it may
be that universal participation in the conduct of activities is not a
major issue.
Stimulating universal participation in the conduct of hydrocarbon
and mineral extraction in Antarctica is a more theoretical than practi-
cal issue-perhaps even more theoretical than participation in deep
seabed mining. The idea of a universal intergovernmental oil company
would certainly arouse concern among the territorial claimants, the
adherents to free market principles, and those otherwise satisfied with
a less-than-universal regulatory system in Antarctica.
On the other hand, it is possible that the question of "equitable"
participation in resource development may arise among the Consulta-
tive Parties themselves. As complex as the question may be, its resolu-
tion may in turn help resolve differences between claimant states and
non-claimant states. Some participation by southern hemisphere
states is inevitable because operators would doubtlessly need support
facilities in the territory of those states. Thus, in light of the practical
situation, elaborate formal structures for promoting shared participa-
tion among the Consultative Parties may not be necessary or desirable.
3. Participation in Benefits
At one level, anyone who participates in the exploration and
exploitation of Antarctic hydrocarbons and minerals expects a poten-
tial benefit from the risk and investment of labor and assets. To that
extent, participation in the activity itself is one aspect of participation
in the benefits (or losses) of the activity.
113. While the universal commercial mining "Enterprise" is a new and controversial
feature of the Law of the Sea Convention, one might note that analogous ideas in other
fields have proved to be workable. INTELSAT and INMARSAT are examples. Agree-
ment Relating to the International Telecommunications Satellite Organization (INTEL-
SAT), with annexes, Aug. 20, 1971, 23 U.S.T. 3813, T.I.A.S. No. 7532; Operating
Agreement Relating to the International Telecommunications Satellite Organization
(INTELSAT), with annex, Aug 20. 1971, 23 U.S.T. 4091, T.I.A.S. No. 7532; Convention
on the International Maritime Satellite Organization (INMARSAT), with annex, Sept. 3,
1976, 31 U.S.T. 1, T.I.A.S. No. 9605 (entered into force July 16, 1979); Operating Agree-
ment on the International Maritime Satellite Organization (INMARSAT), with annex,
Sept. 3, 1976, 31 U.S.T. 135, T.I.A.S. No. 9605 (entered into force July 16, 1979). The
United States itself considered a similar approach to the reprocessing of nuclear fuels as a
way of controlling the proliferation of nuclear weapons.
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At another level, one must ask who will benefit from the eco-
nomic activity associated with the use of the resources. Who will
transport them? Where will they be refined? Who will consume
them? Will they be sold on the world market at world market prices?
From one perspective, it is certainly true that all consumers
everywhere in the world benefit indirectly from an increase in world
supply, whether or not they benefit directly from the Antarctic supply.
This appears to be the underlying approach of the Law of the Sea
Convention, despite its distributive ideas with respect to participation
in exploitation. Transport, processing,114 and marketing by private
miners are not regulated by the Seabed Authority. One of the under-
lying policies of the system is "increased availability of the minerals
derived from the Area as needed in conjunction with minerals derived
from other sources, to ensure supplies to consumers of such
minerals."-'
Nevertheless, the stated objectives of the United States in the
deep seabed mining negotiations were not limited to increased supply
in response to world market demands. Constant references were made
in the domestic debate to politically secure sources of raw materials-
a reaction to the efforts of certain oil producers to use their control
over supply for political as well as economic leverage. Thus, the
United States insisted on a right of access related not only to a private
citizen's right to derive profit from investment, but also to the state's
interest in securing supplies of raw materials under the control of its
own or friendly nationals. This benefit is a further aspect of the ques-
tion of the right to participate in mining activities. Its value depends
in large measure on one's assessment of the potential strategic or eco-
nomic effectiveness of a boycott.
The question of a state's direct financial benefit is largely a ques-
tion of royalties and taxation where private companies are involved.
To the extent that states tax the activities or income of their nationals,
this benefit will also flow from participation in mining activities.
There is little indication that national income taxes were regarded as a
major source of benefit in the deep seabed mining negotiations." 6
The main issue is whether the parties collectively will extract pay-
ments from miners in excess of those necessary to cover administrative
114. The effect of Annex 3, article 5, is that mining technology, but not processing tech-
nology, is subject to the mandatory transfer of technology provisions of paragraphs 1-4.
"[S]hipboard processing immediately above a mine site" is subject to environmental regula-
tion under Annex 3, article 17, paragraph 2(f).
115. Law of the Sea Convention, supra note 42, art. 150(e).
116. The United States, for example, refused to yield its rights to tax its nationals any-
where in the world, and therefore with respect to income derived from deep seabed mining,
primarily for reasons of principle and to prevent extreme expectations regarding the pay-
ments miners would be able to make to the Seabed Authority.
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costs. Whether in the form of payments on production or payments
on profit, most states require such payments for mining on land. The
Law of the Sea Convention requires international payments both from
miners in the International Seabed Area' 1 7 and from the coastal state
for minerals produced from the continental shelf in areas seaward of
200 miles. 18
Some may argue that if payment is not extracted, it may result in
a windfall to the exploiter, who will nevertheless sell his product at
market prices. On the other hand, fixing a rate of payment that will
not deter investment involves substantial difficulties, particularly
under the harsh and pioneering circumstances that will exist in Ant-
arctica for the foreseeable future. Economists as well as environmen-
talists would caution against regarding Antarctica as a pot of gold.
An expectation of substantial "royalties," however unrealistic,
could promote pressure by the beneficiaries to proceed with exploita-
tion. On the other hand, the absence of royalties and taxes could pro-
duce similar pressure from private companies. Environmental groups
would have legitimate concerns about such pressure from either
source.
These problems aside, the collection of a payment raises difficult
political issues regarding its distribution. As its etymology suggests, a
"royalty" implies a sovereign. If distribution is limited to Consultative
Parties," 9 an issue arises regarding their legal right to appropriate all
"benefits" to themselves. If a preference is given to the territorial
claimants, the implication of some "recognition" of the territorial
claim is unavoidable, textual assertions to the contrary notwithstand-
ing. If distribution is universal,' 20 presumably with a preference for
countries in need, the implication arises of some universal "property"
interest in the minerals.' 21 If universal revenues are distributed only
from the unclaimed part of Antarctica, the implication regarding the
claimed areas is clear.
Perhaps more than any other question regarding exploitation of
Antarctic minerals, the question of whether to collect and distribute
payments from miners poses difficult theoretical issues regarding the
117. Law of the Sea Convention, supra note 42, arts. 140, 160(2)(f)(i), 162(2)(o)(i);
Annex 3, art. 13.
118. Id., art. 82.
119. Distribution limited to parties to a special treaty on Antarctic mineral resources
may be the equivalent of this result if the treaty is not automatically open to accession by
all.
120. Distribution limited to treaty parties may be the equivalent of this result if the
treaty is automatically open to accession by all, which is essentially the case with the
Antarctic Treaty itself. Antarctic Treaty, Appendix, infra, art. XIII, para. I.
121. The question of a distribution mechanism would also exist, which would raise the
political issue of United Nations involvement.
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legal status of the Consultative Parties and the legal status of the terri-
torial claims. If the basis for the special position of the Consultative
Parties is something like a condominium, then there is no need to dis-
tribute payments outside the group; if the basis is "special responsibil-
ity" in the nature of a trust, then presumably the trust must benefit all.
These problems suggest two alternative approaches. First, states
might defer a decision on the question of payments from miners until
the economics of Antarctic oil and mineral development are better
understood. Alternatively, states might decide in principle that pay-
ments made will be used exclusively to administer the minerals regime
and to promote scientific research and environmental protection in
Antarctica. Everyone with an interest in Antarctica would benefit to
the extent of that interest. If certain states do indeed have a special
interest in Antarctica, they will receive special benefit from such
expenditure of the funds.
For the foreseeable future, perhaps the most important benefits
the world as a whole can expect to derive from the Antarctic regime
are scientific knowledge, protection of the environment, avoidance of
discord, and increased supply of food and perhaps other raw materi-
als. From that perspective, haggling over the distribution of "royal-
ties" (that, at least at the outset, will certainly be meager) may have a
more detrimental effect on the major values at stake than investing the
"royalties" to promote those values, either indirectly by foregoing the
payments or directly through research and environmental projects.
The environmental regime applicable to deep seabed mining in
the Law of the Sea Convention is a strong one. All indications suggest
that the fragility of the Antarctic environment will result in yet a
stronger environmental regime applicable to Antarctic mineral devel-
opment. I leave to Professor Joyner 122 the elaboration of this point
with one warning: the environmental regimes in the Law of the Sea
Convention are strongest in areas of no territorial sovereignty, and are
especially weak with respect to pollution resulting from activities
within the land territory of states. Those who are prepared to make
implicit concessions to the territorial claimants in Antarctica for the
sake of environmental (or other) values may be buying short-term
rhetoric at the expense of substantial long-term risk.
4. Summary of Conclusions Regarding Political Effects
A strong chance of a universal regulatory regime for Antarctica
similar to the deep seabed mining regime of the Law of the Sea Con-
vention has never existed. Some who favor or oppose the Law of the
122. See Joyner, supra note 2.
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Sea Convention because of the potential precedential effects of its deep
seabed mining regime may understand too little about Antarctica and
worry too much about the moon. Aside from questions of political
philosophy and global institution building, it is not clear that a univer-
sal regulatory regime for Antarctica is either necessary or desirable,
even if it were possible.
The political effects of the Law of the Sea Convention derive
largely from its controversial deep seabed mining regime. The contro-
versy over this regime is driving the Antarctic Consultative Parties
closer together. Both the territorial claimants and the major industrial
powers believe they have strong reasons to resist applying in Antarc-
tica the kind of universal minerals regime set forth in the Law of the
Sea Convention. Industrial states that are not Consultative Parties
may also believe they are better off dealing with the Consultative Par-
ties than with politicized U.N. voting majorities.
The reaction to the deep seabed mining regime in the Law of the
Sea Convention confirms that the only likely result regarding
Antarctic hydrocarbons and minerals is an arrangement among the
states most concerned. In the context of the Antarctic "club," the
states concerned may well make concessions to each other that they
might never consider making in a universal negotiation.
Those who think the result in Antarctica therefore will be the
"guaranteed access" to minerals that the United States sought on the
deep seabeds are probably very optimistic. True enough, the small
group negotiation minimizes the risk of offensive economic rhetoric
and confusing detail on access to resources. The real political
restraints on access will be written cleanly in the rhetoric of environ-
mental protection and decision-making procedures. Because the
motives of those states given the power to impose political restraints
will not be written into text, one can more easily avoid confronting
them. The absence of a meaningful guaranty of access is likely to
become apparent only if territorial claimants are given the special con-
trols over access that some are now suggesting.
The "right" of access to Antarctic minerals is likely to be far less
certain and less free of foreign political control under an Antarctic
arrangement of the kind now being discussed than it is under the deep
seabed mining provisions of the Law of the Sea Convention. A minor-
ity of governments represented in an international political body is
likely to have effective (if not explicitly discretionary) power to decide
whether any given company can drill or mine in Antarctica or the
adjacent continental shelf.123 This could change if the United States
123. Compare Law of the Sea Convention, supra note 42, art. 162(2)0)(i): "[1]f the
[Legal and Technical] Commission recommends the approval of a plan of work .... the
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dramatically reasserts an interest in access to resources and the free-
market, consumer-oriented principles that led it to reject the Law of
the Sea Convention. 124 At present, there is no indication that this will
occur.
The objective of ensuring that Antarctica "shall not become the
scene or object of international discord"' 125 may be too important to
the states most concerned to be confused by rhetoric and ideology, be
it free markets or the common heritage of mankind.
plan of work shall be deemed to have been approved by the Council unless the Council
disapproves it by consensus among its members excluding any State or States making the
application or sponsoring the applicant." (Emphasis added).
124. Similar changes might occur under pressure from the Federal Republic of Ger-
many and the United Kingdom.
125. Antarctic Treaty, Appendix, infra, preamble.

